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When patient care is delivered  as a series of independent, rather 
than interdependent actions of expert professionals, quality of 
care and  patient safety is likely to be negatively impacted . 
-AHRQ TeamSTEPPS 
A team of experts is not an expert team… 
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Complex sociotechnical system  
System 
Processes 
People 
• Relationships  
• Interactions 
• Local rationality 
• Complicated patients 
• Dynamic 
• Evolving 
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Challenge: Manage Systems 
 Interrelationships between all components  
 Generate and  enhance positive interactions between 
components 
 Change negative interactions into positive 
 Foster understanding and  communication of what the 
object is 
        NO MIND READING 
     NEVER WORRY ALONE 
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Traditional approach 
The ABC’s (Good old  days…)  
Assess 
Blame  
Crucify 
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Post Event Debrief 
an integral component 
of our Immediate Event 
Management and the 
initial analysis of our 
RCA  process 
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Debrief  
Backbone of Our Patient Safety Culture 
Purpose  
 examine existing processes and  systems, not ind ividuals 
Intent 
 improve patient care quality, system performance 
improvement, and  utilization of resources 
Protection 
 Confidential Patient Safety Work Product, Protected  under 
the Patient Safety and  Quality Improvement Act 
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 Debrief  Checklist 
 
 
Debrief Video 
Patient  
A  35 year old  chronically ill male who resided  at a long 
term care facility presented  to Emergency Department 
with altered  mental status, lethargy, and  vomiting.  
 
Past Medical History 
 Insulin Dependent Diabetes 
 Congestive Heart Failure 
 Hypertension 
 End Stage Renal Disease – Dialysis 
 Chronic Pain 
 Multiple CVAs 
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Lab Tests 
Metabolic panel 
Creatinine 8.7 
BUN 52 
Glucose 132 
K+ 4.7 
Bicarb 22 
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Course in ED 
 Altered mental status possibly secondary to pain 
medication side effects 
 Observation   
 Monitored in ED overnight 
 Returned to baseline clinical status 
 
 Vomiting recurred 
 Hematest positive 
 Possible gastritis 
 
 Repeat labs ordered, drawn by phlebotomist and sent 
to the lab 
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Laboratory Process 
Requested  redraw    
Documented  as “canceled” 
EMR (Powerchart) 
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 Multiple attempts by clinical providers to re-collect labs were 
unsuccessful due to poor venous access  
 Patient refusal 
 Further attempts at venipuncture abandoned  
 No further vomiting  
 Condition stabilized , mental status returned  to baseline 
 Admission considered  
 Hospitalist (who knew patient from multiple prior admissions) 
advised  d ischarge  
 Discharged  to long term care facility 
 
 
 
Patient Course 
15 
 Increased  lethargy  
 Hypotension 
 Transport to ED initiated  
 Glucose (POCT) > 500 
  → DKA 
Labs 
Interosseous line 
 Glucose 664 
 Potassium 6.6 
 pH 6.9 
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Return to ED within Two Hours 
 The patient decompensated  rapid ly, 
resulting in code  
 Resuscitation successful 
 7 liters of flu id  
 Vasopressors continued  
 Transferred  to an intensive care unit 
 Ventilator support required --tracheostomy  
 Ongoing hemodynamic and metabolic 
support 
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Safety First Learning Report 
 Initiated  -- lab quality d irector 
 His task: Review critical lab results 
 Investigate events 
 Obtain information 
• Readmit to ED 
• Interosseous line 
• Code 
 Inference: worry and concern 
 Debrief: Gaps in information 
 Facts as known 
 
 
 Worry/ concern inferred  
 Additional information 
 Re-admitted  to ED  
 Code in ED 
 Gaps in information/ understanding 
triggered  debrief—facts as known 
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Debrief Process 
Interprofessional Participants identified   
 Participants invited - ind ividual who initiated  the report, 
patient care team(s), involved  departments with 
leadership representation  
 In this case, participants included:  
 Laboratory Director, VP, Chair Pathology, Lab Scientist  
 ED physicians, Chair, Vice Chair, Attending MD, Nurses, 
Residents  
 PI Staff 
 Risk Management 
 Facilitator 
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Debrief 
 Tension and polarization 
 Defensive Posturing 
 Protectionism- “support” 
 Why are we here? Just don’t let it happen 
again… 
 "Two monologues do not make a 
dialogue." - Jeff Daly 
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Framework 
 Ind ividual Objectives 
 ED-safe efficient care 
 Lab-required  to observe patterns that suggest compromise 
in integrity of sample affecting accuracy of test results 
 Positions 
 Territories of experts 
 Frame of reference 
 Culture/ context embedded  
 Assumptions 
 Design and  communicate 
 Communication challenges 
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Debrief 
 Everyone was right and  provided  appropriate care 
 Something went wrong 
 Construction vs authentic Reconstruction 
 Inside corners of complex systems not generally known  
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First story—Hindsight  
outcome based  
 No redraw, no d ialysis catheter invasion, no 
central line 
 Discharge, not admission 
 Clinician attribution of error—human error, 
negligent, reckless, irresponsible 
 Human closest to accident is source or cause 
of failure 
 “But for”, “if only”, “my bad”  
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2nd Story—Insight  
path to constructive learning and  change 
 BUT…if this is the conclusion, wrong frame of 
reference for understanding the behavior  
 Easy to stop at ind ividual attribution of error—need 
to look up and  out, not down and in…. 
 Systems thinking….health care errors are rarely 
caused  solely  by an individual 
 This error was a symptom of an embedded systems 
problem 
 Multiple conditions created  conditions that led  to errors 
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 Deeper Dive into Lab Process  
 What did canceled mean?                               To 
clinicians it meant 
 no testing was done 
 no sample arrived   
 specimen lost 
 could  not obtain result  
 clotted  
 hemolyzed  
 machine broke down  
 someone else canceled  
 specimen destroyed  
 no results available 
 any or all of the above 
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Communication of Canceled  
 What d id  canceled  mean to Lab? 
 Met criteria for suspected  contamination  
 Basis- delta checks to assess contamination  
 
+ criteria            + contamination     =      canceled  
 
 Conclusion:  
 Unreliable and  invalid , therefore results unreportable 
 Based  on experience, anecdotes, policy and  culture 
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Local rationality--LAB 
 Determine compromise in integrity of specimen affecting 
accuracy of test results 
 Contaminated  = unreliable 
                              unreportable 
                              Redraw necessary 
 Expectation: redraw (not d ischarge) 
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Debrief led  to Wicked  Question  
 Were results from initial lab draw reported  as “canceled” 
actually processed  and  available? 
                                   Yes 
Initial Lab values:             Prior Lab values: 
 Potassium 7.0 mmol/ L     Potassium 4.7 
 Bicarb 8 mmol/ L               Bicarb        22 
 Glucose 610 mg/ d l          Glucose    132 
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Realization = Discovery 
 Actual specimen results had  been 
generated  and  interpreted  by 
medical laboratory scientist for 
“specimen valid ity” and  
determined to be unreliable 
 Need for redraw communicated  to 
ED clerk, but 
 No communication to clinician 
required   
 Local rationality: harm could  
result if treatment initiated  based  
on erroneous contaminated  result 
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 Led the provider to d iagnose DKA 
 Prompted  a more aggressive attempt to 
redraw blood or point of care testing 
 Prompted  the administration of insulin and 
IV flu ids 
 Resulted  in patient admission to the 
hospital, NOT discharge                                                            
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Knowledge of “canceled” results 
by clinician(s) would  have 
Lessons Learned  from Debrief 
“Canceled” 
 Clinician--Results not available 
 Lab- Unreliable, therefore unreportable 
 Lab Process not known or understood  by those outside of 
laboratory 
 Lack of awareness by laboratory professionals of  impact 
of current policy/ process on clinical decision -making 
 Profound system vulnerability initially identified  
through debrief process 
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 Analysis of unintended clinical outcomes is 
retrospective by definition but does allow for 
thorough, systematic review of all elements 
of care from a perspective that is not always 
feasible in the midst of real time care delivery 
 A timely multid isciplinary debrief with 
clinicians and  staff involved  in care 
maximizes initial appreciation of what 
happened and  the impact on patient and  staff 
 Teams engaged in further analysis can delve 
more deeply into systems issues identified  
during debriefs 
 Immediate actions can be taken to provide 
the safest possible care and  mitigate harm to 
our patients 
Value of Debriefs 
Summary—Debrief 
 Diversity—safety, value 
 Perspectives 
 Narratives 
 Minority Opinions 
 Dissent encouraged  
 Level the hierarchy 
 Decentralization 
 Voluntary and  protected  
 Authenticity 
 Vitality of everyday life in a system  
 Insider accounts 
 Process of sensemaking 
 Local rationality 
 Trade-offs in a system 
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Example of Debrief Discoveries:  
Variation in Interpretation of Canceled  notation   
 “Canceled” lab label in EHR did  not have the same 
meaning to the bedside clinician as it d id  to laboratory 
staff 
 
 Use of PI tools 
leveraging 
Debrief 
information 
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Post-Event Debrief and RCA Results 
 
Root Cause 
“The process for handling highly abnormal 
laboratory results presumed to be secondary to 
contamination allowed the option for a redraw 
request from lab -- without d irect communication of 
the suspected  invalid  results to the provider for 
clinical correlation .” 
Revised                     Process 
No 
New sample 
collected 
Test canceled 
Result posted in EMR as 
ALERT* 
Redrawn sample 
result confirms 
“contamination”? 
Clinician 
confirms 
potential  
contamination?  --result entered 
into EMR ALERT* initiated 
Report result in 
EMR 
Call clinician and 
share result 
Lab Test Result 
Perceived 
contamination 
Result reflects 
patient condition 
“true” 
contamination 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
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New View in EMR 
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Success of changed  process 
 Greater communication with clinicians 
 Enhanced  documentation of suspected  contaminated  
results 
 Increased  interdepartmental understanding and  
cooperation 
 Concurrent review by lab staff and  clinicians likely to 
result in  
 Improved  patient care and  improved  patient safety 
   Supports value of debrief process 
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Best Practice for Debriefs 
 Debrief immediately following or soon after harm event  
 Willingness to question assumptions about systems 
and  processes 
 Openness does not last long if debrief d iscussion not 
initiated  in timely way 
 Critical to d iscovery that goes beyond initial 
perception that only some people or parts are 
unreliable 
 Unsettles the reassurance of safety of systems 
 Diversity of participants and  viewpoints 
 Leveling of hierarchy 
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Just Culture 
not “who” but “what” was responsible 
ADVANCE OUR 
LEARNING  
CULTURE 
  
 
PROMOTE OPEN  
AND FAIR  
CULTURE 
  
 
MANAGE 
BEHAVIORAL 
CHOICES  
 
 
DESIGN 
 SAFE  
SYSTEMS 
 
Leaders are responsible for designing and implementing 
systems that support the safe choices of healthcare workers  
Healthcare workers are responsible for the quality of their choices  
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CANDOR 
 
Communication and  Optimal 
Resolution 
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